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Introduction
Contemporary discussions about authenticity could be traced back to Charles 
Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity, in which he publicly announced his worry 
that authenticity could be diminished by utilitarian calculations. Although re-
cent debates over authenticity do not focus on the role that utilitarianism 
plays in modern society, it more or less shared the concern that certain prac-
tices could pose great threat to authenticity. Carl Elliott’s widely cited work, 
Better than well, echoes Taylor’s worry, arguing that the use of enhancement 
is detrimental to authenticity. One major reason for Elliott to highlight the 
problem of enhancement is that enhancement may not really enhance a per-
son, but replace the person’s authentic self with bogusness.
Current discussions (Bolt, 2007; DeGrazia, 2000; Levy, 2011) about au-
thenticity, then, shift to the debate of whether or not identity is important. 
Elliott insists that identity is crucial for one to be authentic, which implies 
that authenticity can only be achieved by self-discovery, a practice of self-
reflection without the help of enhancement. Nevertheless, David DeGrazia 
AbstrAct: This paper aims to provide a clarification of the 
long debate on whether enhancement will or will not di-
minish authenticity. It focuses particularly on accounts 
provided by Carl Elliott and David DeGrazia. Three clari-
fications will be presented here. First, most discussants 
only criticise Elliott’s identity argument and neglect that 
his conservative position in the use of enhancement can 
be understood as a concern over social coercion. Second, 
Elliott’s and DeGrazia’s views can, not only co-exist, but 
even converge together as an autonomy based theory 
of authenticity. Third, the current account of autonomy 
provided by DeGrazia fails to address the importance of 
rationality and the ability of self-correction, which, as a 
result impedes the theory to provide a fully developed 
account for authenticity. In conclusion, a satisfactory ac-
count of authenticity cannot focus only on identity or sub-
jective preference.
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resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo es clarificar el deba-
te sobre si la mejora disminuye o no la autenticidad. Se 
centra de modo especial en las versiones ofrecidas por 
Carl Elliot y David DeGrazia, y se presentan tres clarifi-
caciones. En primer lugar, la mayoría de los participantes 
en el debate sólo critican el argumento sobre la identidad 
de Elliot y no tienen en cuenta que su postura conser-
vadora en relación al uso de mejoras puede entenderse 
como una preocupación por la coerción social. En segun-
do lugar, los puntos de vista de Elliot y DeGrazia no solo 
pueden co-existir, sino incluso converger en una teoría 
de la autenticidad basada en la autonomía. En tercer lu-
gar, la versión de la autonomía actualmente ofrecida por 
DeGrazia desatiende la importancia de la racionalidad y 
la capacidad de auto-corrección, lo que supone un impe-
dimento para desarrollar una teoría que proporcione una 
comprensión plenamente desarrollada de la autenticidad. 
Como conclusión, se afirmará que una explicación satis-
factoria de la autenticidad no puede centrarse en exclusi-
va en la identidad o en las preferencias subjetivas.
PAlAbrAs-clAve: autenticidad, autonomía, mejora humana
Received: 18/07/2015 
Accepted: 25/07/2015
Debate:  Cognitive enhanCement, an ethiCal Debate
D
IL
EM
A
TA
, 
añ
o 
7 
(2
01
5)
, 
nº
 1
9,
 3
9-
52
IS
S
N
 1
9
8
9
-7
0
2
2
40
Pei-hua huang
contains that identity is secondary in the issue of authenticity. Authenticity is ful-
filled, according to DeGrazia, out of self-creation. One shall be free to pursue her 
ideal, even if it will involve the use of enhancement and dramatic changes in the 
person’s personality or physical appearance. The self-discovery and self-creation 
view are often labeled as two rivalry accounts that cannot co-exist.
Yet, here in this paper, I will try to approach this issue from a different angle. I will 
first deal with the issue of identity. I will provide an examination on Elliott’s identity 
argument and then point out that this argument has several problems that may not 
be solved easily. I will then point out that Elliott could actually abandon his iden-
tity argument and focus on concerns over the social coercion he mentioned in his 
work. Despite that, most discussants, including Elliott himself, neglect the problem 
of social coercion, it is what makes certain enhancement morally susceptible. After 
this clarification is made, I will then move on to argue that Elliott’s and DeGrazia’s 
position are not so different that the two cannot hold in the same time. Rather, 
once the identity argument is abandoned, the two will be almost identical, for they 
both pay great attention on autonomy. Nevertheless, the convergence also means 
that the two accounts share certain flaws together, i.e., the negligence of the im-
portance of rationality. Autonomy, according to the two accounts, is defined mainly 
by subjective preference. The importance of rationality and ability of self-correction 
are missing in the discussion. The paper will end with a conclusion that to provide 
a fuller account of authenticity, autonomy and rationality are the keys, rather than 
the technology one employs and subjective preference one possesses.
1. Elliott’s Identity Argument and Two Types of Intervention
One of the major reasons for philosophers to interpret Elliott’s position in the quest 
for authenticity as enhancement conservative is the emphasis he puts on identity. 
Elliott contends that the effects introduced by enhancement can never help one to 
be better because enhancement will change the identity of the enhanced. I shall 
label this account as the identity argument:
It would be worrying if Prozac altered my personality, even if it gave me a better personality, 
simply because it isn’t my personality. This kind of personality change seems to defy an ethics 
of authenticity (Elliott, 1998, p. 182).
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Elliott invites us to imagine a gloomy accountant who is unhappy about his life and 
complains that “Jesus Christ, is this it? A Snapper lawn mower and a house in the 
suburbs?” (Elliott, 2000, p. 180). He uses this accountant to highlight the point that, 
according to the identity argument, even though taking Prozac may alleviate the 
discontent of the accountant from both the first-person and the third-person point 
of view, the so-called improvement does not truly improve the accountant. The im-
proved mood, no matter how positive it is, is not the true mood that the accountant 
possesses. In other words, Prozac does not solve the accountant’s personal issue at 
all. It only introduces a new person, who sees the Snapper lawn mower and a house 
in the suburbs with satisfaction, to replace the unhappy middle-aged man. Elliott 
suggests that it would be better for the accountant to remain unhappy since the 
accountant can maintain his identity, and realise there is a gap between his current 
life and the life he truly wants to have.
However, an important notion Elliott adopts for his identity argument has not been 
given a clear definition. That is, the inner self (sometimes interchangeable with the 
inner voice). All we can learn from his work is that the inner self he uses does not 
need to be interpreted with an essentialist’s view:
“To many people, the phrase ‘authentic self’ brought to mind a core of identity whose attrib-
utes are fixed and immutable, casted in childhood and hardened by adulthood, stable and 
unwavering no matter who or what circumstances a person might encounter…you can buy 
into the idea of an authentic self without buying into the idea of an essentialist self.” (Elliott, 
2004, pp. 48-49, my italics)
What exactly this assertion can give to us in the debate of the use of enhancement 
and the quest for authenticity, nevertheless, remains unclear in his work. If one’s 
inner self is mutable, how can we establish an account for his identity argument, for 
instance? What makes a mutation free of the charge of altering the inner self while 
the other culpable?
This difficulty could be resolved once Elliott adopts a distinction among different 
types of interventions: those that trigger alteration, and those that engender devel-
opment. In the defence of the authentic self, Elliott seems to tacitly use this distinc-
tion to argue that change of the authentic self introduced by conventional practices 
such as education or group therapy does not pose threats to one’s identity because 
it only helps a person to develop her inner self. On the contrary, the use of enhance-
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ment alters the inner self. For Elliott, the enhancers that work in accordance with 
their chemical mechanisms designed by scientists, do not aim to help one’s given 
talents or temperament flourish. Instead, they introduce external influences that 
cover or even replace one’s inner self with features that do not belong to the en-
hancement receivers. This defence is fairly straightforward and is presumed to save 
Elliott’s identity argument from the accusation of being ambivalent.
2. Suspiciousness of the Value of the Inner Self
However, although the distinction between development and alteration could ex-
plain why the change introduced by enhancement such as Prozac is problematic 
for Elliott, unfortunately, this clarification cannot resolve all the difficulties Elliott’s 
identity argument has.
First, it is unclear why we should praise and try to preserve the inner self. There 
are values other than ‘remaining true to oneself’ that are cherished by most people. 
Though the so-called inner self, or the true self, can serve as a basis for us to testify 
whether we are living in a life that is not full of self-deception, the inner self is not 
always benign. Despite the rarity of this example, our inner self may be that of a psy-
chopath who loves to kill or torture. It seems to contradict to our intuition that people 
who are born to be ‘less moral’ should try any means to change themselves. This 
indicates that it is not intrinsically good for one to remain identical to her inner self.
One possible response that Elliott may use to answer this challenge is that the psy-
chopathic or the less moral self is not the real self, but a malfunctioning self. Elliot 
may revise his view into that ‘being authentic is that one lives in accordance with his 
or her “normal functioning inner self.”’ If one is born with mental disorder, we should 
try to adopt medical intervention to restore his or her mental health to the normal 
function. He may argue that, unless these people receive appropriate treatment, 
they will not be able to discover the true self that can provide them the guidance 
towards an authentic life.
How to distinguish the normal and the abnormal, nevertheless, is very difficult. 
Many (Fukuyama, 2002; Sandel, 2007) appeal to the concept of human nature 
to set the boundary for treatment, because they believe human nature can tell us 
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what sort of property a normal human being should have. Yet, this approach has 
drawn numerous attacks. (Buchanan, 2009; Hull, 1986; Lewens, 2012). In short, 
according to our current understanding of biology, the heterogeneity of behaviors 
observed among human populations is too diverse to permit us to describe a single 
set of archetypal human behaviors with any confidence. As human behaviour has 
changed exceptionally fast over the past few thousand years relative to other spe-
cies, it is impossible to describe an immutable account of human nature.
The diversity of mankind, though highly praised by biologists, also causes great 
problems for bioethicists who would love to argue that there is a natural or objec-
tive distinction between the normal and the abnormal, hence enhancement and 
treatment. In a research paper, Simonson et al. (2010) found the genetic basis for 
Tibetan’s distinctive suite of physiological traits which enable Tibetans to live in low 
oxygen conditions. The evolutionary process may be traced back to 7,000 to 5,000 
years ago, when a group of people started to occupy the Tibetan Plateau during the 
mid-Holocene (Su et al., 2000). Within in 10,000 years, Tibetans had soon evolved 
many physiological traits that enabled them to live in such a harsh environment. 
These particular traits, according to current studies, are so unique that they could 
not even be found in the neighboring Han Chinese and the other lowland peoples 
(Chen et al., 1997; Erzurum et al., 2007).
Now, let us consider the following scenario. Suppose that C is a Caucasian athlete 
who specialises in ultra-marathons and whose current endurance in low oxygen 
conditions is not as good as the average modern Tibetan. He wants to be success-
ful in his career and therefore tries to use contemporary technology to improve his 
physiological functions that are relevant to low oxygen condition endurance. Into 
which category should we classify his attempt, treatment or enhancement?  If we 
compare C’s functions with modern Tibetans, we probably will have to say that the 
intervention C imposes on himself is a treatment for it merely raises his functions to 
the level of those of average Tibetans. Nevertheless, some may argue that C shall 
only compare his physiological fitness with other Caucasians and therefore this at-
tempt should be regarded as enhancement. Setting this sort of reference group 
seems to show that the so-called human nature cannot give us an objective and 
value-free definition of the normal function of homo sapiens. Rather, the result of 
the attempt demonstrates how humans evaluate themselves.1 
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3. Perplexity of the Originality of Alteration
Apart from the notion of the inner self, the implicitly posited distinction of altera-
tion and development is also questionable. As I have shown before, the distinction 
is crucial for Elliott if he intends to preserve his position that, though the inner 
self could be mutable, the change introduced by enhancement is unacceptable. 
Nevertheless, how to distinguish interventions that trigger development of the self 
from those that introduce alteration and replacement is something that he left with-
out fuller explanation.
Education, for instance, could be a hard case for this distinction. In a longitudinal 
study, Schlaug et al. (2005) showed that music training could influence children’s 
brain activities, according to the analysis of fMRI data collected by the team. The 
data of this study also suggested that music training can enhance visual-spatial, 
verbal, and mathematical performance, though the underlying mechanism remained 
unclear. In another study, M. K. Chen (2013) shows that languages we acquire may 
influence our inter-temporal decision-making. He found languages that grammati-
cally associate the future and the present foster future-oriented behavior. Users of 
these sorts of languages tend to save money more than those who speak languages 
that do not possess this feature. The discovery of these universal effects demon-
strates that even conventional education tends to reduce individual’s mental idio-
syncrasies and variations. could function as a die and shape us into persons sharing 
similar characteristics, erasing our uniqueness. Influence they pose onto a person 
could also be more significant than Prozac or Ritalin as the studies suggest because 
the introduced effect is not even reversible.
Introducing the distinction of bio-medical and non-bio-medical helps little in this case, 
too. Elliott may argue that the influence from education is non-bio-chemical and 
therefore will not alter one’s identity. Yet, if we adopt the view that bio-medical in-
terventions poses a threat to authenticity, we are arguing that aspirin, caffeine and 
other similar substances that are widely used in our daily life are equally a threat to 
authenticity. Besides, if it is the mechanism behind the change of one’s self that both-
ers Elliott, technological innovation could undermine his worry completely in the fu-
ture, too. Though the scenario is unlikely to occur in the near future, we can imagine 
that a group of scientists invent a new generation of anti-depressant whose effect will 
take place in the exactly same way that a talk therapy is going to introduce to a hu-
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man brain. Suppose that such an anti-depressant is invented and could improve the 
moods of people like the unhappy accountant described in Elliott’s work, should we 
label the change it introduces as an alteration even if the effect it has and the change 
it imposes on human brains are exactly the same as talk therapy? There would prob-
ably be more hard cases for the bio-enhancement conservatives who focus only on 
the means one employed for the intervention in the future.2 
4. Elliott’s Real Concern: Enhancement as a means of Coercion
Most discussions on Elliott’s position in enhancement and authenticity end with chal-
lenges they raised for his identity account (cf. Bolt (2007); DeGrazia (2005)) and 
conclude that Elliott’s argument can never be a successful defender of the enhance-
ment conservative position. They fail to notice that Elliott’s main concern could 
actually be saved without the help of his identity argument. Charles Taylor’s words 
cited in Elliott’s work show us that, besides identity, there is another angle to ap-
proach the issue of authenticity. That is, the ever-interacting relationship between 
an individual and his surroundings. Taylor once contends that the discovery of one’s 
identity is like a dialogue. Interlocutors in the dialogue include both the selves that 
dwell in our mind and the selves of other people we encounter in the external world. 
The quest of authenticity is never a quest in isolation, but a quest that is full of in-
teractions (Taylor, 1991, p. 48) The chief task of the journey to authenticity, thus, is 
preventing dependence on or submission to others. It indicates that the real threat 
against authenticity is not the use of enhancement but social coercion. Many people 
attempt to use enhancement because they want to fulfill the expectations of others, 
which in turn makes enhancement coercive and against one’s true wishes.
Shifting the focus to social coercion explains Elliott’s seemingly ambivalent attitude 
about his identity argument when it comes to certain radical interventions, e.g., sex 
reassignment surgery and blepharoplasty (cosmetic eye surgery). Sex reassign-
ment surgery and blepharoplasty, if we focus only on the procedure, are essentially 
cosmetic surgery. Cosmetic surgery is widely seen as a form of enhancement for 
it is often not conducted out of the concern of health, and ,without the patient’s 
request, surgeons normally would not perform either of the surgeries to their pa-
tients. Nevertheless, Elliott’s attitude towards the two types of surgery is fairly 
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different. Concerning the case that many transsexuals struggle with the idea that 
whether they should receive sex reassignment surgery, Elliott wrote:
“... today you must listen to the voice within you. The crowd might drown out the inner voice; 
you might find it difficult to hear because of all the other voices that are shouting all around 
you. But listening to it is crucial, because only that inner voice can tell you the person you are 
to be and the way you are to live.” (Elliott, 2004, p. 33, my italics)
Whereas, when it comes to the practice of blepharoplasty, he decries that:
“…the problem with cosmetic surgery is not just racism or sexism, not just a matter of 
unjust ideology; it is also an ethos in which the opinions of other people…have taken on such 
enormous significance” (Elliott, 2004, p. 203)
Despite the fact that sex reassignment surgery in general causes greater changes 
and has higher health risks to a person than blepharoplasty does, Elliott encourages 
transsexuals passionately to ignore the mainstream ideology that one’s gender iden-
tity should correspond to the sex he or she was born with and receive the surgery 
to fulfill their ideals. Yet, when it comes to blepharoplasty, he blames the practice 
as a conformity of unjust ideology. His attitude towards the two types of cosmetic 
surgery implies that what makes the use of some enhancements problematic is not 
about that of the practices themselves, but that the desire to seek the help from 
enhancement is often due to social coercion. Elliott’s stress on self-discovery and 
the value of inner self shall, as a result, be seen as an admonishment that every 
attempt to change oneself, regardless of whether it is done via bio-medical or con-
ventional means, moderate or radical intervention, has to be based on one’s true 
wish, instead of the confusing mainstream ideology.3
5. Convergence of the Two Rivalry Accounts of Authenticity
Reading Elliott’s words in this way shows that his position can be converged into 
the so-called self-creation account of authenticity advanced by David DeGrazia. 
Many often see the two approaches as incompatible, including Elliott and DeGrazia 
themselves, because DeGrazia labels his account as self-creation, rather than self-
discovery. Nevertheless, self-discovery does not, as a result, become dispensable to 
DeGrazia’s account, and self-creation is not therefore meaningless for Elliott as we 
can see from the case of sex reassignment surgery. 
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Further examinations on work of the two sides show that their views about authen-
ticity can actually converge with each other. For instance, one of the most serious 
problems that we have in the modern society, according to Elliott, is that many 
people do not know why they would like to pursue particular enhancements. (2004, 
p. 188). As people can easily be blinded with the desire to receive positive recog-
nition from others, self-discovery highlights the importance of clarifying what they 
would really want to have. Without this crucial step, the so-called self-creation phi-
losophy could be mere conformity to the social norm. In fact, DeGrazia has noticed 
this potential problem for the project of self-creation. Although he does not use the 
term, self-discovery, the notion he adopts for his self-creation account shares the 
same spirit, i.e., autonomy. Unlike the Frankfurt-Dworkin hierarchical account of 
autonomy, he stresses more on the identification of subjective preference. In the 
standard version of the hierarchical account, whether an action is autonomous or 
not is decided by the relationship among desires of different orders. According to 
the account, the first-order desire is the desire to conduct certain acts in certain 
ways, e.g., the desire to drink. The second-order desire, unlike the first-order de-
sire, is not directly about the action itself but about ‘the desire to conduct certain 
actions.’ In theory, one could have desires higher above the second-order desire as 
one keeps introspecting on his desires. With orders of desires, the hierarchical ac-
count distinguishes autonomous action from non-autonomous actions by examining 
whether lower-order desire and higher-order desire conflict with each other or not.. 
Take addiction as an example. A person who is influenced by addiction is not really 
autonomous if her first-order desire of taking more drugs is in a confliction with her 
second-order desire that she should not desire to desire to take the drug. Yet, for 
DeGrazia, whether lower-order desire is in a confliction with higher-order desires is 
not the most crucial factor for one to behave autonomously. Rather, the most crucial 
criterion is that the desire (in DeGrazia’s work he uses preference instead) of an 
agent to conduct an action cannot be from an alienating influence:
A autonomously performs intentional action A if and only if (1) A does A because she prefers 
to do X, (2) A has this preference because she (at least dispositionally) identifies with and 
prefers to have it, and (3) this identification has not resulted primarily from influences that 
A would, on careful reflection, consider alienating. (DeGrazia, 2005, p. 102, italics in origin)
The definition of autonomy articulated by DeGrazia echoes Elliott’s view that one has 
to be aware of the possibility that her desire to conduct a certain action is not what 
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she genuinely would like to have. The desire could be formed by an external influ-
ence that is alienating. Constant vigilance is an essential task for one to embark on 
self-discovery and self-creation. Due to the emphasis on the identification of personal 
preference, I shall call this account preference-identification account of autonomy.
6. Advantages and Limitation of the Preference-identification Account of 
Autonomy
One of the major advantages that DeGrazia’s preference-identification account can 
provide to the investigation of authenticity is that it could avoid listing desires that 
are formed out of coercion as authentic desires. Irving Thalberg (1978) points out 
that under certain situations, one could be so frightened that she simply could not 
have a higher-order desire that fights against her first-order desire of submission. 
For instance, when being pointed by a gunpoint, most people would not have a high-
er-order desire that tells them not to follow the aggressor’s instruction. Since there 
is no higher-order desire that conflicts with the first-order desire of following the 
aggressor’s instruction, according the traditional hierarchical account of autonomy, 
the submission would be regarded as autonomous, even though few of us would see 
the desire to succumb in this sort of circumstance as a reflection of our true voice.
The brilliance of the preference-identification account is the way it highlights that 
even if one has no higher-order desire against the idea of following the aggressor’s 
instruction when stunned, this does not imply that one would, therefore, identify 
the preference of submission as not alienating. The desire to voluntarily succumb 
to an aggressor is formed out of the fear of losing one’s life, which is something 
few would identify as their preference. Hence, coerced actions sharing the similar 
features with the case of under the threat from an aggressor will not be considered 
as autonomous actions.
Emphasising identification of preference, however, cannot provide us with a complete 
account of authenticity. Although this account can avoid the aforementioned problem 
the hierarchical account has, it fails to provide a way out for the case of psychopath 
in the issue of authenticity. Consider the case of psychopath again. Suppose there is 
a psychopath P who considers the meaning of his life as killing. He kills because he 
prefers to kill (fulfilling the first condition). He has the preference of killing because he 
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identifies and prefers to have it (fulfilling the second condition). And the identification 
does not from influences he considers alienating for he thinks he was born for killing 
and killing is the mission of his life (fulfilling the third condition). According DeGrazia’s 
account of autonomy, if the psychopath P really kills, the killing committed by him 
will be an autonomous action. Nevertheless, we seldom take this sort of action as 
autonomous because P lacks the ability to know that his behaviour seriously violates 
fundamental moral laws. It seems that both Elliott and DeGrazia neglect the fact that 
the search of one’s genuine desires does not guarantee a solid foundation for a per-
son to have an authentic life. After all, subjective preferences are not the primarily or 
sole source for us to constitute autonomy and authenticity.
7. Enhancing Rationality as a Way to Fulfill Authenticity
A recent work written by Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu provides us with a poten-
tial way out to escape from the aforementioned predicament that a psychopath who 
has no internal conflict among his subjective preference can also be a candidate of 
fulfilling authenticity. Although Schaefer et al.’s argument focuses on the potentiali-
ty of enhancing autonomy, their account, nevertheless, brings up a missing element 
in DeGrazia-Elliott’s preference centered view of authenticity: the reasoning ability. 
They point out that despite the great difference among different theories concern-
ing autonomy or authenticity, to fully fulfill the aim of these theories, reasoning 
abilities are indispensable. For instance, in the hierarchical account of autonomy, if 
one wants to know whether or not he is autonomous, he will first have to have the 
reasoning ability to recognise his higher-order and lower-order desire. A Kantian 
will have to employ the same ability to distinguish the categorical imperative from 
hypothetical imperative. Back to the relative novel account of autonomy advocated 
by DeGrazia, the identification of preference certainly involves this ability for the 
recognition of alienating influence.
To make it more clear, the problem of DeGrazia’s account is not that there’s no role 
for the reasoning ability to play at all, but that the reasoning ability is used only for 
identification of preference. The preference-identification account misses the fact 
that reasoning abilities are more important than preference in when we are about 
to determine whether one has autonomy or not. We seldom consider people under 
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the influence of brainwashing to be autonomous because their voluntary coopera-
tion with the government without any resentment towards the ruling party is often 
due to their lack of logical competence, comprehension, and abilities of doing criti-
cal analysis. Under such circumstance, many would not notice that their subjective 
preferences could be based on false beliefs and could also contradict objective truth.
To seek authenticity, one cannot just follow her personal preference. The reasoning 
abilities that could provide guidance for one to have self-correcting are also crucial. 
As the case of the psychopath shows plainly, it is dubious for anyone to claim that 
once the desire to conduct an action is not formed by an alienating influence, the 
action shall be regarded as autonomous. One has to be equipped with sufficient 
reasoning abilities to facilitate her not just to identify her personal preference out 
of numerous noises made by the surrounding, but also further test the preference 
with rigid logical analysis. Traditional enhancement such as courses that aim to pro-
mote people’s critical thinking and increase their sensitivity to logical fallacies could 
help people to discover flaws in their reasoning, hence garnering better resistance 
against social coercion. Chemicals that can improve one’s cognitive function can 
also be seen as beneficial for one to achieve authenticity. People with depression, 
for instance, often lose their reasoning abilities and become irrationally pessimistic 
about themselves. The overwhelming negative emotion often impedes the depres-
sion sufferers from being aware that they are viewing their current situation with 
contradictory ideas. In this situation, even Prozac could be seen as an enhancement 
that helps one improve one’s reasoning abilities so as to conceive a plan to seek 
authenticity.
8. Conclusion
The paper has shown that Elliott’s identity argument has several problems that 
are difficult to be overcome. A better strategy for Elliott to adopt is to abandon his 
identity argument and focus on the issue of social coercion, which leads to a con-
vergence of his self-discovery and DeGrazia’s self-creation account. The paper also 
shows that neither Elliott nor DeGrazia notices the importance rationality plays in 
autonomy and authenticity. The key to alleviate the problem of social coercion is not 
just about listening to the inner voice or identifying the preferences, but about how 
Authenticity, Autonomy, And enhAncement
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to use and improve our reasoning abilities to help us critically examine the external 
world and the internal voice.
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Endnotes
1. For more discussion concerning the difficulty of defining the concept of health/normality with bio-
statistic approach, see Boorse (1977) for the idea of bio-statistic theory of health and Kingma 
(2007) for the difficulties of this approach.
2. Some may be unsatisfied with this sci-fi scenario and argue that even if this scenario could 
become real in the future, it does not alleviate the unease of the value embodied behind treating 
people with drugs. Parens (2000) points out that even if the final result of different medical 
interventions is all the same, how we achieve the goal still matters. Treating depression with group 
therapy or anti-depression may both alleviate one’s emotional pain, yet the values underlying the 
employment of the two vary greatly—using anti-depressants as a solution to emotional pain could 
presume that human is no more than a relatively complex machine. The discomfort of seeing 
humans as complex machines is understandable, but it could hardly be served as a supporting 
argument for Elliott. The point of Parens’ argument is about how we should see human beings, 
whereas Elliott’s original argument concerns more about the change an intervention is going to 
introduce, not about the values embedded in the intervention.
3. One can find similar point in Elliott’s own words.  In the chapter entitled as ‘The True Voice,’ he 
told his readers he was uneasy about the idea of voice training course until he found that some 
of the courses were not aiming to promote the idea that certain accents are better than the other 
but to help male-to-female transsexuals to acquire the voices they would otherwise have if they 
were born to be females. Elliott seemed to be more sympathetic to this sort of attempt than to 
the attempt of changing the shape of nose sought by many Jewish people. The difference of his 
attitude could result from that he regards the former as listening to the true voice while the later 
conformity to the majority (Elliott, 2004, pp. 188-190).
